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Farmer Forward Pricing Behavior:
Evidence from Marketing Clubs
Kevin McNew and Wesley N. Musser
Numerous studies have investigated how farmers should use forward pricing markets, but only
limited research exists on how farmers actually use these markets. This study relies on data from a
real-time forward pricing game employed by Maryland grain marketing clubs from 1994 through
1998. Hypotheses are tested regarding the consistency of farmer behavior with the research literature
on hedging. Findings indicate that farmers do not achieve price enhancement, a result consistent with
the efficient market hypothesis. However, pricing behavior does not conform to the implications of
efficient market models in a number of respects, suggesting farmers may form different expectations
than those conveyed by forward prices.
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Less government intervention in commodity mar-
kets has heightened farmers’ exposure to price risk
and has created a stronger desire among farmers to
attempt to manage this risk by using forward pricing
markets. Although numerous applied research stud-
ies have focused on risk management using futures
and options markets, it would appear past research
has failed to meet the needs of practitioners, and
ultimately farmers.
For example, surveys of extension economists
suggest they perceive that risk management research
is of little relevance to real-world decisions such as
forward pricing (Anderson and Mapp, 1996). Fur-
thermore, extension and research marketing econo-
mists hold different opinions on what motivates
farmers to use forward pricing markets (Parcell et
al., 1998).
These differing views about forward pricing also
are documented in the literature. Most research
economists would endorse the “efficient market”
view, as argued by Zulauf and Irwin (1998)—i.e.,
that futures markets yield the best expectation of a
commodity’s price in the future. This view has con-
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siderable empirical support, including analyses by
Fama and French (1987), Just and Rausser (1981),
and Rausser and Carter (1983), to name a few.
Under the efficient market view of futures prices,
farmers are unlikely to profit consistently from for-
ward pricing strategies, so risk aversion becomes the
primary motive for using forward markets.
A large body of research has derived optimal
hedging rules under this assumption (Peck, 1975;
Kahl, 1983; Myers and Thompson, 1989; Lapan,
Moschini, and Hanson, 1991; Sakong, Hayes, and
Hallam, 1993). The hedge ratio has drawn consider-
able empirical attention in the literature for two
reasons. First, the hedge ratio is based on the ratio
of the covariance between cash and futures prices
to the variance of futures prices. As such, it is easily
estimated from a simple regression where cash prices
are regressed on futures prices.
Second, if prices are normally distributed and
transactions costs are zero, an individual’s optimal
hedging decision is independent of his or her risk-
aversion parameter. Lence (1996) recently general-
ized the assumptions for this independence. Thus,
empirical estimates of the hedge ratio have the poten-
tial for widespread applicability. However, empirical
complications, such as time-varying covariance and
variances, can exist in most applications.
Farmers seldom follow the prescriptions offered
by this research. Based on survey data from farmers,
it appears they hedge significantly less than would
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be expected under the efficient market assumption
(Patrick, Musser, and Eckman, 1998; Goodwin and
Schroeder, 1994). Although production risk may be
one explanation for lower hedging (Grant, 1985), in
their survey of large-scale Midwestern grain pro-
ducers, Patrick, Musser, and Eckman found that
farmers considered yield risk to be a lesser issue
than other factors such as credit constraints and
margin calls. While not explicitly considered in
Patrick, Musser, and Eckman’s survey, diversifica-
tion of wealth and hedging transactions costs could
also limit the use of forward pricing (Lence, 1996).
1
The price enhancement view is consistent with
the second segment of the literature that suggests
farmers can use forward markets to achieve higher
prices. Based on their survey, Patrick, Musser, and
Eckman (1998) found the majority of farmers
believe forward markets present an opportunity to
achieve higher prices, confirming the relevance of
this view for farmers. If farmers have different
expectations from those portrayed by forward
prices, then their use of forward markets can be for
the purpose of increasing profits as a result of those
differing expectations, rather than managing risk.
A recent study by Kenyon (2001), based on a
survey of farmers prior to planting, reported
farmers as a group tended to underestimate the risk
of a downside price movement between planting
time and harvest, which would suggest they may
not obtain adequate price protection. Other research
investigating the price enhancement view has
sought to identify profitable forward pricing strat-
egies (e.g.,Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin, 1998).
Whether farmers use forward pricing strategies
to enhance prices or to manage risk is a debate like-
ly to continue. However, a common problem in the
forward pricing literature is the lack of evidence on
farmers’ use of forward pricing markets. Some
research has been conducted on tracking agricul-
tural marketing advisory services as a proxy for
farmer forward pricing decisions (e.g., Bertoli et
al., 1999; Irwin et al., 2000), although Pennings et
al. (2001) found that only 11% of the subscribers to
market advisory services follow the recommen-
dations “very closely.” Before applied research in
this area can be improved, analysts need to observe
farmers’ actions in these markets to better under-
stand how farmers form price expectations and
utilize forward pricing tools (Brorsen and Irwin,
1996).
This study examines farmer forward pricing deci-
sions in a marketing game conducted over the period
1994 through 1998. Farmers in Maryland grain mar-
keting clubs participated in a real-time marketing
simulation allowing paper transactions in forward
markets over the marketing season. Unlike other
studies where survey data are utilized at one point
in time (e.g., Patrick, Musser, and Eckman, 1998),
these marketing simulation data enable us to study
farmer behavior over several years and within mar-
keting seasons. Thus we are able to assess whether
farmers use forward markets to manage price risk
or to enhance prices.
Study Hypotheses
The efficient market view of hedging implies farm-
ers forward price a proportion of their crop, known
as the hedge ratio. Based on empirical studies on
grains, the hedge ratio is in the range of 0.85 to
1.00 without yield uncertainty (Myers and Thomp-
son, 1989); the ratio drops to a range of 0.55 to 0.90
with yield uncertainty (McNew, 1996), depending
on the extent of yield variability and correlation
between yield and price. Higher yield uncertainty
increases the likelihood that production will not
meet the contract requirement. In addition, nega-
tively correlated price and yield provides a natural
hedge on revenue, thereby reducing the hedge ratio.
Under the standard hedging model assumptions,
forward pricing is purely risk reducing because
farmers believe forward prices are unbiased. At a
minimum, we would expect to see a high propor-
tion of the crop forward priced if farmers followed
this rule. Furthermore, hedging theory would argue
that the amount forward priced does not change
over time, unless the relevant correlations change
over time. Earlier research by McNew and Fackler
(1994) tested time variation in the hedge ratio from
an estimated GARCH model, and did not find sig-
nificant variation in the case of corn.
The above reasoning suggests several hypotheses
for this analysis:
P Farmers should forward price a high proportion of
their crop (approximately 85S100%) each year.
P The hedge ratio should not vary over years based
on past price relationships or current price expecta-
tions.
P The hedge ratio should not vary over the growing
season.
1  Along with Lence (1996), alternative theoretical explanations for
hedging behavior have also been investigated by Collins (1997) and
Brorsen (1995). These studies determine that bankruptcy risk and the size
of transactions costs can influence hedging levels.202   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
The alternative view that forward pricing in-
creases prices received and perhaps also decreases
risk is more ad hoc than the above reasoning, and is
therefore not as easy to summarize into hypotheses.
However, the presumption is that farmers can
identify pricing opportunities which increase prices.
Consequently, we would expect the reverse of the
above hypotheses—i.e., forward pricing should vary
throughout the marketing season, and perhaps from
one year to the next. If this is true, then an interest-
ing question is: What information influences farm-
ers’ forward pricing decisions?
For example, under an adaptive expectations
view, farmers’ current price expectations should be
strongly influenced by price levels in the previous
year. If current prices are below these expectations,
farmers will wait for better opportunities, which
presumably will arise in the future. Thus, one
would expect less hedging if prices are lower than




A typical grain marketing club is comprised of a
group of farmers and agribusiness personnel who
discuss and explore marketing strategies and out-
look. Clubs are usually associated with the Cooper-
ative Extension Service, with agricultural marketing
specialists and extension agents providing edu-
cational training on the marketing process. In
Maryland, the educational component is enhanced
through a practical marketing exercise called the
Model Farm.
The Model Farm is a hypothetical 1,000-acre farm
with 600 acres of corn, 200 acres of soybeans, and
200 acres of wheat. Crop yields are the same for
every club and are assumed to be constant, so pro-
duction risk does not influence pricing decisions.
Club participants make joint marketing decisions
for the Model Farm at their meetings, which usually
occur once every two weeks.
The Model Farm serves as an exercise in
promoting an understanding of how the tools will
perform in actual market situations. Farmers make
decisions about when to price, how much to price,
and what tool (cash sale, forward contract, futures
contract, or options contract) to use. These market-
ing activities are hypothetical, as no actual pricing
is done with real grain. No monetary transactions
costs are assumed for futures and options trades.
Table 1. Maryland Grain Marketing Clubs
Participating in the Model Farm, 1994S S S S1998
Years Participating
Club Name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Carroll County TTT





Indirect costs such as learning about forward pricing
are also not accounted for, but club members reduce
such costs by participating in the Model Farm exer-
cise.
At the end of each year, marketing clubs turn in
their trading records. These records describe the
date, the size, and the types of transactions made
throughout the marketing year.
2 Nine marketing
clubs participated in the Model Farm trading exer-
cise between 1994 and 1998. However, because
three of the clubs only participated for one year, they
are excluded from the analysis. After 1998, no clubs
participated in the exercise. Table 1 identifies the six
marketing clubs examined here and lists the spe-
cific years during 1994 and 1998 each club partici-
pated in the Model Farm exercise.
To simplify the analysis, we consider only corn
transactions for the pre-harvest pricing window.
3
This time period is from January (prior to planting)
until harvest time in November. Figure 1 shows the
mid-month price for the December corn futures
contract over the five marketing years included in
the analysis.
As observed from figure 1, forward prices varied
substantially not only in terms of their level from
one year to the next, but also in terms of seasonal
pattern. With this pattern, any routine hedging strat-
egy would have led to significant variation in hedg-
ing profits. In 1994 and 1998, the forward price fell
consistently and bottomed at harvest time. In 1995,
the reverse trend occurred as the forward price rose
throughout the season and reached a high at harvest.
2  Certainly, decisions made in a game setting may not be consistent
with actual behavior. However, applications of experimental economics
have shown that participant behavior often mirrors expected actions from
economic agents (Fackler and McNew, 1998). While there are inherent
limitations in associating Model Farm trading behavior with actual
trading behavior, the data are a reasonably good proxy for understanding
expectations and forward pricing behavior.
3  Examining only corn transactions does abstract from any portfolio
effects which may be occurring when farmers make forward pricing deci-





































In 1996 and 1997, high and low prices were posted,
respectively, during the summer.
Each club has 60,000 bushels of corn that may
be priced through forward contracts for 1,000 bush-
els or exchange-traded futures and options contracts
for 5,000 bushels. Although the clubs use forward
contracts for local markets, in this study all cash
forward prices are based on the December futures
price for the date when a contract is entered. This
assumption means the basis is zero, allowing us to
draw comparisons across clubs. In addition to for-
ward contracts, clubs may use futures contracts, call
options, or put options to forward price their corn,
strategies which are also based on the December
contract.
4
Combining Futures and Option Positions
Use of options introduces a complication for ana-
lyzing how much has been hedged. For example, a
$2.50 put option provides different price protection
than a $2 put option. Similarly, pricing 5,000 bush-
els with a futures contract at $2.50 is different than
pricing 5,000 bushels with a $2.50 put option.
We use the delta value of an option to determine
how much price protection is offered through a
certain option position. The option’s delta measures
the change in the option premium from a one-unit
change in the underlying futures price.
5 For put
options, the delta value is in the range of [!1,0],
while for call options the range is [0,1]. A short
futures position has a delta value of !1. Because
forward contracts are simply futures contracts that
cannot be offset, they too have a delta of !1.
An option’s delta value depends on two main
factors. First, the strike price of the option relative
to the underlying futures price is a key component.
With declining futures prices, the delta for a put
option will increase in absolute value, and the delta
for a call option will decrease. Indeed, arbitrage
guarantees that the delta of a call option and a put
option with the same strike price will sum to 1 in
absolute value.
6
4  Some clubs utilize contract months other than the December month
for purposes of storage or because of early harvest decisions. Therefore,
we have taken the liberty of converting all non-December contracts into
December contracts. For example, if a club takes a short futures position
for September 1995 corn on March 31, 1995, we have instead changed
the club’s position to short a December 1995 contract on the same date.
With options, if a club buys a March 270 put option when the March
futures price is 280, we convert this transaction to a December put option
that is 10¢ out-of-the-money. Less than 10% of all futures and options
transactions were non-December contracts, so the impact of changing to
a December contract is likely minimal.
5  We assume futures prices are lognormal, and adopt the methodology
outlined by Black (1976) to compute the implied standard deviation of the
price distribution based on observed option prices. The delta measures the
change in the option price based on a change in the futures price, and is
computed numerically.
6  A conceptual proof of this statement can be made by showing that a
synthetic futures position can be created from a portfolio of a put and call
option with the same strike price. For example, a synthetic long futures
position is created from a long call option and short put option with the
same strike price. Therefore, the delta of the portfolio is δc ! δp, which
equals the delta of the long futures position (+1).
 Figure 1.  December corn futures price, Chicago Board of Trade,
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The second factor influencing an option’s delta
is the length of time until expiration. In the extreme
case when the option is at expiration, a call (put)
option’s delta will be either 0 or 1 (!1), depending
on whether the option has intrinsic value. Prior to
expiration, an option’s delta will be somewhere in
between these values, depending on the time until
expiration and the relationship between the futures
price and strike price.
Using the concept of an option’s delta, it is
straightforward to add positions in forward, futures,
and options contracts. For each club throughout the
five-year study period, we construct a delta-weighted
hedge ratio, which is the quantity-weighted sum of
each portfolio instrument. Bertoli et al. (1999)
adopted the same approach in assessing the hedging
portfolio of marketing advisors. Although the delta
approach is a local measure, it does provide a use-
ful way to measure the downside price protection




A fundamental price forecast is used in the analysis
of club behavior. This forecast is for December
futures price based on monthly U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) forecasts of corn supply and
demand. If farmers adjust their forward pricing
decisions based on this economic data, we would
expect to see greater hedging when the futures price
is high relative to the fundamental price forecast.
The fundamental price forecast is estimated every
month based on the USDA’s projections for corn
supply and demand in its World Agricultural Supply
and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report. In this
report, the USDA provides forecasts of supply, use,
and ending stocks. The projections for ending stocks
are perhaps the single most important statistics be-
cause they measure the surplus to be carried forward
to the next crop year (Purcell and Koontz, 1999). A
common way to develop a price forecast is to incor-
porate as an explanatory variable the ending stocks
as a percentage of total use. Therefore, we construct
an ex ante forecast of the December futures price in
November of the same year based on the latest
USDA estimate of the ending stocks-to-use ratio
(SUR). The model is of the form:
(1)   Ft ' a(SURt)b,
where Ft is the December corn futures price in mid-
November, and SUR is the stocks-to-use ratio from
the November WASDE report for the current mar-
keting year. This model captures the essence of a
storable commodity market where prices increase
proportionally more at low stocks than high stocks.
To develop estimates for a and b, a seven-year
rolling sample is used to estimate the model of equa-
tion (1). The data consist of the previous seven-
years’ value for the SUR estimate in November and
the corresponding December futures price in No-
vember. Based on the estimated model from (1), a
forecasted December futures price is computed each
month in the current marketing year derived from
USDA’s estimate of the SUR. At the start of a new
marketing year, the model is reestimated using the
most recent seven years of data.
The choice of seven years of data is based on the
need to develop a simple predictive model that
responds more rapidly to current conditions. For
1994 through 1998, the model fits relatively well,
with the R
2 ranging from 0.74 to 0.98, and the
parameter estimates are reasonably stable. For ex-
ample, at a SUR value of 10%, the price projections
range from a low of $2.81 per bushel in 1995 to a
high of $2.91 per bushel in 1997.
Regression Models
To analyze the factors influencing hedging behavior,
we begin by estimating a seasonal model of the
form:





where Hkt is the proportion of the crop forward
priced in month k of year t, Mi is a set of seasonal
dummy variables, and Yj is a set of yearly dummy
variables.
8 Two seasonal dummy variables are used,
one for the pre-planting period of January to April
and the second during the critical growing season
of May to July. The intercept accounts for the case
of August to November 1996.
To investigate whether clubs are responding to
information, we augmented equation (1) with vari-
ables that may influence expectations:
7  The results reported in this study are not appreciably different if a
simple sum of the positions is used (i.e., options are treated as !1 or +1).
8  Whether farmers exhibit variation in their usage of puts/calls and
forward/futures contracts would be of interest. Unfortunately, individual
clubs show a tendency to use one pricing instrument over another. For
example, Washington and Carroll County clubs were heavily slanted
toward forward contracts and very seldom used options. Kent County was
at the opposite extreme, using mostly options contracts. As such, this
group of farmers seems to have a personal preference for certain instru-
ments, although this may not be true in a larger sample of farmers.McNew and Musser Farmer Forward Pricing Behavior   205





% δ2RPkt% δ3FPkt% ekt,
where TP is a dummy variable that measures the
price trend using a 20-day moving average of past
prices. If the current price is above the moving
average, then the trend is higher and the dummy
variable takes a value of 1. If farmers use technical
analysis to form the basis of their price expectations,
then we would expect a higher trend to be associated
with less hedging.
The variable RP in equation (3) represents the
current price relative to the previous year’s high
price. This variable measures the extent to which
the current year’s price is relatively high or low
compared to a reference price from last year. If
farmers tend to make forward pricing decisions
relative to last year’s prices, we would expect this
variable to be significant although the sign of the
variable is unclear. For example, if farmers have
adaptive expectations, then a high current price
relative to last year would imply greater hedging. In
contrast, if farmers use current prices as the basis
for forming expectations, then high current prices
relative to last year may signal higher prices in the
future and less hedging.
The third variable from (3), FP, is the current
futures price less the fundamental price based on a
price forecast derived from the monthly USDA-
WASDE supply and demand report (discussed
above). A positive value for FP indicates the cur-
rent price is above the fundamental price. This
variable is similar to the approach of Wisner, Blue,
and Baldwin (1998), where marketing years are
classified as a short crop year if expected produc-
tion is less than expected usage. Our approach
differs in that FP changes monthly and measures
the difference between a fundamental value and the
observed futures price. If farmers make pricing
decisions based on market fundamentals, we would
expect them to forward price more if FP is positive.
Results
Although the perceived major benefit of hedging
among agricultural economists is to reduce price
risk, an empirically important question is whether
farmers have the ability to consistently profit from
their forward pricing decisions. Table 2 presents the
average forward pricing profits by individual year
and for the full sample from 1994S1998. Forward
pricing profits for each year are the difference














1994 21.0 5 38.5
1995 !26.2 6 !74.0
1996 27.9 6 95.3
1997 !0.6 4 !20.0
1998 30.3 3 42.5
1994S98 10.5 16.5
a Defined as the December corn futures price in May (planting) less
the December corn futures price in November (harvest).
between the net price received for corn and the price
at harvest. These profits account for all transactions
through forward, futures, and options contracts.
For comparison, the last column of table 2 shows
the change in the December futures price between
May and November. A positive number indicates
the forward price was higher at planting in May
than at harvest in November. Stated another way, a
farmer who routinely hedged his or her entire pro-
duction in May would have averaged a 16.5¢ higher
price per bushel than by selling corn at harvest be-
tween 1994 and 1998.
As a group, the clubs made positive profits in
1994, 1996, and 1998 (table 2), which were years
when prices were lower at harvest than earlier in
the season, making any pre-harvest pricing strate-
gies profitable.
In contrast, 1995 was a year when prices rose
consistently throughout the marketing year and
were highest at harvest with a 90¢ difference
between the harvest price and the seasonal low. Not
surprisingly, the clubs earned negative profits,
which were statistically different from zero that
year.
In 1997, the harvest-time price was roughly the
same as the price in the early spring, after bottom-
ing in the summer, and the clubs on average exper-
ienced a small loss. In general, the profitability of
a club’s annual trading is highly correlated to the
direction of price change. For all clubs, the corre-
lation between club profits and the futures price
change between May and November is 0.84.
For the entire 1994S1998 time period, forward
pricing profits for all clubs averaged 10.5¢ (table
2). However, the t-statistic was 0.98, indicating the
clubs were not able to achieve statistically signifi-

































The results reveal the marketing clubs parti-
cipating in this study did not consistently beat the
market or earn statistically significant profits from
forward pricing over the five-year sample period.
Thus, the findings support the efficient market
hypothesis of hedging. However, it is important to
note that the sample size and zero transactions costs
limit the generality of this conclusion. Although
there are numerous marketing clubs on which to
base the test, only five marketing years were avail-
able. With more marketing years, the results may
differ.
Figure 2 depicts the delta-weighted hedge ratios.
This graph illustrates the all-club average by year
and for the average of all years from 1994S1998.
From figure 2 it is apparent that clubs have a strong
seasonal tendency to hedge less in the spring
and more in the summer. Also, the amount hedged
is significantly less than what is prescribed by
hedging theory. At its peak, the all-club average
was 0.67 in August 1998, but the average in each
year suggests a normal level of about 0.45. When
all years are averaged, the proportion priced in-
creases from the start of the year until July where it
reaches 0.45, and is constant for the remainder of
the year.
9
Clubs exhibited considerable variation in hedging
from year to year, especially from July until harvest.
The amount hedged at harvest (October) ranged
from a low of 0.1 in 1997 to a high of 0.68 in 1994.
Comparison of these results to those from Bertoli et
al.’s (1999) survey of marketing advisory services
reveals remarkable similarity. For example, in Aug-
ust of 1995, the average marketing advisory service
had priced 35% of the corn crop, while the average
marketing club had priced 40% of the crop at the
same time.
Overall, these characteristics suggest club parti-
cipants may be using forward pricing for reasons
other than pure risk reduction. Hedging levels are
well below 0.9 for all years, and are observed to
vary from year to year as well as seasonally. Given
that hedging behavior appears to be dynamic, and
not myopic or static, we now consider whether these
decisions are influenced by observable factors.
To test for variation in hedging behavior, equa-
tion (2) was estimated for each club using ordinary
least squares. Parameter estimates from equation (2)
are given in table 3. Preliminary tests indicated
first-order serial correlation in the residuals for the
Carroll and Talbot clubs, so the regression models
for these clubs were corrected for autocorrelation.
If clubs are purely minimizing risk, one would
expect all the seasonal and year coefficients to be
zero, implying no difference in hedging behavior
across years or within the marketing season. F-
statistics reported at the bottom of table 3 indicate
9  If club participants were making pricing decisions on the basis of
yield risk, one would anticipate that yield risk would be nearly eliminated
by September when the crop has reached maturity. Because clubs on
average price only 45% of their crop after September, farmers’ pricing
motives are not likely tied to yield uncertainty.
 Figure 2.  Average proportion forward priced by marketing clubs,
 1994S S S S1998McNew and Musser Farmer Forward Pricing Behavior   207
Table 3.  Parameter Estimates: Seasonal Model for Proportion Forward Priced by Marketing
Clubs
Marketing Club



















































































































2 0.59 0.73 0.61 0.54 0.91 0.53
No. of Observations 30 36 55 55 44 33
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.
a F-tests are used to determine the significance of the seasonal dummies, the yearly dummies, and both sets of dummies (combined seasonal
and yearly).
a rejection of the constant hedging hypothesis
within a season as well as across marketing years
for all clubs. The annual dummy variables confirm
the above finding that the clubs systematically
changed their pricing behavior from one year to the
next. As compared to the base of 1996, two clubs
hedged significantly more in 1994, while one club
hedged significantly less. In 1995, three clubs
hedged significantly less and two clubs hedged sig-
nificantly more compared to 1996. Likewise, three
clubs in 1997 and two in 1998 had significantly dif-
ferent hedging compared to 1996.
The seasonal coefficients reported in table 3 con-
firm the seasonal relationships seen in figure 2,
discussed above. All clubs demonstrated signifi-
cantly lower levels of hedging in the pre-planting
period of January to April as compared to hedging
levels in August through November. However,
from May to July, only one of the six clubs showed
a systematic tendency to hedge less during this
period as compared to August through November.
These results do not imply that clubs do not change
their forward pricing position after May, but rather,
the clubs do not change their hedging in a system-
atic fashion after May. One explanation for the dif-
ferent levels across years and within a year is that
clubs change their forward pricing behavior based
on expectations, which is explored in equation (3).
Estimates for equation (3) are presented in table
4. Preliminary tests again found first-order serial
correlation for Carroll and Talbot counties, and the
models for these clubs were corrected for autocor-
relation. F-statistics for the significance of the
seasonal variables, the year variables, and the price
trend variables (TP, RP, and FP) are also reported
at the bottom of table 4. As discussed above, all
clubs show some tendency to hedge less when the
price trend is positive, as denoted by the negative
coefficients on the trend dummy variable (TP).
However, only two clubs have a statistically signif-
icant coefficient at the 5% level. Based on the
parameter estimate for TP, clubs tend to hedge 1%
to 10% less of their entire crop during a higher
trending market.208   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 4.  Parameter Estimates: Model for Proportion Forward Priced by Marketing Clubs Based
on Relative Prices
Marketing Club




































































































































































2 0.60 0.73 0.72 0.63 0.94 0.675
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.
a F-tests are used to determine the significance of the seasonal dummies, the yearly dummies, both sets of dummies (combined seasonal
and yearly), and the relationship of hedging behavior to current price conditions (TP = RP = FP = 0).
Four of the six clubs have a statistically signifi-
cant negative coefficient for RP, the relative price
variable (table 4). These clubs tend to hedge less
when the current price is high relative to the previ-
ous year’s price. Only one club had a statistically
positive sign, suggesting this club hedged more
when prices were higher in the current year relative
to the previous year. Finally, the positive signs on
the fundamental price measure (FP) for five clubs,
four of which are statistically significant, reveal the
tendency by these clubs to hedge more when current
prices are high relative to the fundamental price.
The test statistics at the bottom of table 4 provide
further insight about hedging behavior. In particular,
the three tests of interest concern seasonality in hedg-
ing behavior (denoted as Seasonal Dummies = 0 in
table 4), variation from year to year (Yearly Dum-
mies = 0), and the relationship of hedging behavior
to current price conditions (TP = RP = FP = 0).
The test statistics for all coefficients for every club
are significant, indicating a rejection of the corres-
ponding null hypothesis.
These results suggest several unique features of
farmer hedging behavior. First, this group of farm-
ers exhibits systematic seasonal hedging patterns,
tending to hedge less in the spring and more in the
summer. While this behavior could partly be ex-
plained by yield uncertainty, it may also be due to
farmers’ unwillingness to commit to a forward posi-
tion early in the season without information aboutMcNew and Musser Farmer Forward Pricing Behavior   209
market-level crop conditions. Based on the test
statistic for price condition variables, it seems clear
that farmers do adjust their hedging behavior as
price conditions change. However, the significant
yearly dummy variables in conjunction with the
significance of the price condition variables suggest
hedging behavior may be influenced by other factors
we have not measured.
10
According to our findings, farmers change their
forward pricing behavior as market conditions
change. In terms of expectations, farmers as a group
seem to apply no universal strategy in forming their
price outlook. However, the clubs do tend to hedge
more when prices are relatively low, either in com-
parison to the previous year or in reference to a
fundamental value. For example, if FP and RP are
both !10¢ per bushel (implying the current price is
10¢ below the fundamental value and the high from
last year), then four of the six clubs hedge more,
although the amount hedged increases only by 1%
to 4%.
Because the majority of farmers in this study tend
to hedge more during low-price periods, these farm-
ers likely use current prices as a gauge for the market
outlook. Simply stated, farmers may interpret low
prices as a signal that prices will continue to move
lower, and thus forward pricing is warranted. Like-
wise, during periods of high prices, farmers tend to
hedge less, possibly in anticipation of better prices
to come.
Conclusions
The analysis in this study provides support for both
the research and extension marketing views in the
current debate on marketing strategies employed by
farmers. Farmers participating in the marketing
clubs examined here did not consistently profit
from their forward pricing decisions—just as the
efficient market hypothesis and standard hedging
theory would suggest.
However, findings also show farmers’ hedging
activity was not consistent with the implications of
standard hedging theory in a number of respects.
First, farmers tend to forward price significantly
less than what would be dictated by purely risk-
minimizing behavior. Furthermore, the amount
hedged varies considerably in different marketing
years, indicating farmers may be attempting to time
the market even though their ability to do so appears
limited.
Our findings reveal the majority of the marketing
clubs examined in this analysis use relative prices
as a signal of future price direction. In addition,
fundamental information, as measured by this study,
appears to have some minor influence on pricing
decisions. However, the large annual residual vari-
ation identified here indicates that farmers use other
decision-making information for the purposes of
pricing. Consequently, future research on additional
measures used by farmers in their hedging strate-
gies would be helpful in understanding hedging
behavior.
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